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This paper investigates whether and how foreign aid facilitates foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) flows into less developed countries. We employ a large data set of 
source-recipient country pairs and conduct gravity equation-type estimation. Our 
empirical methodology enables us to examine an effect through which aid from a 
donor country promotes FDI from the same donor in particular, which we call a 
‘vanguard effect.’ We find that foreign aid in general does not have any significant 
effect on FDI. However, when we allow for differences in the size of aid effects across 
donor countries, we find robust evidence that foreign aid from Japan in particular 
has a vanguard effect, that is, Japanese aid promotes FDI from Japan but does not 
attract FDI from other countries.
Keywords: foreign aid; foreign direct investment; gravity equation
JEL classifications: F21; F35; O11
1. Introduction
Impacts of foreign aid to less developed countries (LDCs), particularly those on economic 
growth, have been examined recently to a great extent (Rajan and Subramanian 2005; 
Easterly and Levine 2003; Hansen and Tarp 2001; and Burnside and Dollar 2000; among 
many others). Foreign aid also possibly affects foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to 
LDCs, since the purposes of aid for the donor country often include to encourage FDI to 
the recipient country of aid. For example, the OECD argues that foreign aid can improve 
investment environment and thus promote FDI (OECD 2004), and the US government 
explicitly states that a purpose of foreign aid is to encourage FDI (Congress of the United 
States 1997).1 The Japanese government also argues that a reciprocal relationship between 
FDI and aid helps the development of LDC economies (Arase 1994). Accordingly, the 
role of aid in promoting FDI has come to the fore in the policy discussion among gov-
ernment officials and development practitioners (OECD 2006).
  There are a few studies which examine the relationship between foreign aid and 
FDI by using cross-country panel data, most notably Harms and Lutz (2006) and Ka-
rakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005). Harms and Lutz (2006) find that the effect of aid 2
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on FDI is generally insignificant but significantly positive for countries in which private 
agents face heavy regulatory burdens. Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005) also find 
an insignificant effect of aid on FDI, but in contrast to the finding of Harms and Lutz 
(2006), results of Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005) suggest that good governance 
and developed financial markets have a positive effect on aid.2
  Both Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005) use 
aggregate data on FDI and foreign aid for each recipient LDC. This paper extends 
these existing studies by using less aggregated data on FDI and aid, that is, data for each 
source-recipient country pair during the period 1990–2002. This country-pair dataset 
allows us to employ gravity equation-type estimation that is often used in recent studies 
on determinants of FDI such as Egger and Winner (2006), Mody and Razin (2003), 
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), and Wei (2000).
  We presume that there are possibly multiple channels through which aid affects 
FDI, and the ambiguous effect of aid on FDI found in the existing studies may reflect 
the amalgamation of positive and negative effects of aid. These channels include a positive 
‘infrastructure effect’ by improving economic and social infrastructure in the recipient 
country, a negative ‘rent-seeking effect’ by encouraging unproductive rent-seeking activi-
ties, both of which are suggested by Harms and Lutz (2006); a positive ‘financing effect’ 
by improving the ability of the recipient country to finance outflows of profit repatriation 
from FDI; and a negative ‘Dutch-disease effect’ by distorting resource allocations between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors (Arellano et al. 2009).
  In addition to these effects of aid, this paper proposes that aid has a positive 
‘vanguard effect,’ through which foreign aid from a particular donor country promotes 
FDI from the same donor country but not from other countries. For example, if aid for 
infrastructure from Japan to Thailand facilitates FDI flows from the United States to 
Thailand, this might be because the Japanese aid has an infrastructure effect. However, 
if aid from Japan to Thailand promotes FDI from Japan in particular, without affecting 
FDI from other countries, we conclude that the Japanese aid has a vanguard effect. 
  There may be several reasons for this vanguard effect. First, when foreign aid is 
provided, information on the local business environment of the recipient country can 
be exclusively transmitted to firms of the donor country. Second, the fact that the gov-
ernment provides aid may reduce the recipient country's investment risks as perceived 
subjectively by firms of the donor country. Third, aid may bring donor country-specific 
business practices, rules, and institutions into recipient countries. Those effects of foreign 
aid should promote FDI from the same donor country, but do not necessarily promote 
FDI from other countries. 
 3
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  We isolate the vanguard effect of aid from other effects by estimating the effect of 
aid from a particular donor country, rather than the total aid from all donor countries, on 
FDI from that donor. It should be emphasised that the use of country-pair data enables 
us to investigate the vanguard effect, and thus the distinction of the vanguard effect of aid 
on FDI from other effects is a major contribution of this paper. Empirical investigation 
of the vanguard effect is important in practice, since aid is often motivated by the donor 
country's willingness to encourage FDI from the donor, as we noted earlier. 
  In addition, we distinguish between aid for infrastructure and aid for other purposes 
in order to examine possible differences in the size of aid effects between the two types of 
aid, since the two types may influence each type of effect of aid differently, as explained 
earlier. The distinction between these two types of aid has also not been analysed in previ-
ous studies.
  To preview the results, we find that foreign aid in general does not necessarily 
promote FDI, a result consistent with Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan, Neyapti, 
and Sayek (2005). We also find that neither aid for infrastructure nor non-infrastructure 
has any significant impact on FDI. As to the final role of foreign aid on FDI, namely the 
vanguard effect, we find no general evidence of such an effect. We then further examine 
possible differences in the size of the impact of aid among donor countries. Our results 
show that foreign aid for infrastructure from Japan has a vanguard effect, while the effect 
of aid from all other countries on FDI seems to be absent. In other words, infrastructure 
aid from Japan promotes FDI from Japan to the recipient country of aid, while having 
no impact on FDI from other countries to the recipient.3 The size of the vanguard effect 
for Japanese aid is large, since our results imply that six per cent of Japanese FDI in East 
Asia during the period 1990–2002 is attributed to Japanese aid. 
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 specifies the econometric 
model, whereas Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 shows the estimation 
results, which is followed by concluding remarks in Section 5. 
2. The Econometric Model
(a) Estimation equation
To estimate the impact of foreign aid on FDI, we incorporate foreign aid variables to 
gravity equation-type regression. Our gravity-equation framework can be regarded as an 
extension of Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005), who 
examine the impact of foreign aid on FDI by employing the total amount of aid from 
all donor countries to each recipient country as the key independent variable and the 4
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total amount of FDI inflows to the recipient as the dependent variable. In contrast, our 
gravity-equation framework allows us to use foreign aid and FDI between each source-
recipient country pair for estimation.
  In particular, we employ a simplified version of econometric specifications used in 
Egger and Winner (2006) and Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) that are based on the 
knowledge-capital (KK) model developed in Markusen (2002). The KK model suggests 
that the size of the host country's economy should positively affect the extent of hori-
zontal multinationals that produce their products for the host-country market, whereas 
the size of the home country's economy should positively affect the extent of vertical 
multinationals that export their products to the home-country market.4 The KK model 
also suggests that a larger difference in skilled labour abundance between the home and 
the host country provides a greater incentive for firms in the home country to relocate 
labour-intensive production processes to the host country and hence raises the extent of 
vertical FDI. In addition, following Egger and Winner (2006), Mody, Razin, and Sadka 
(2003), and Wei (2000), we assume that geographic distance between the home and host 
country impedes FDI flows.
   These arguments above, and our further presumption that FDI flows are persistent, 




where subscripts i, j, and t denote respectively the source and the recipient country of FDI 
and foreign aid and the time period. The dependent variable, lnFDIijt, is the logarithm of 
the inflows of FDI5 from country i to j at time t, whereas our key independent variable, 
lnAIDij,t-1, is the log of the real value of foreign aid flows from country i to j at time t-1. 
As we will explain below, we will experiment with several alternative measures of foreign 
aid for estimation. We take the first lag of foreign aid to incorporate possible time lags 
between the provision of aid and the decision on FDI. Using the first lag also alleviates 
possible endogeneity due to simultaneity, although we correct for such endogeneity by 
using instruments as we will explain later. GDPi and GDPj represent GDP of country 
i and j, respectively, DISTij the geographic distance between i and j,6 and SKDIFijt a 
measure of skilled-labour abundance in country i relative to j.7 αij, αt, and αijt are country 
pair-specific fixed effects, year-specific effects, and an error term, respectively.
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ing roads, telephone lines and electricity as well as less measurable items like education 
or a reliable and well-functioning bureaucracy,’ (an earlier version of Harms and Lutz, 
2006) and hence raises the marginal product of capital in the country. Therefore, foreign 
aid encourages FDI inflows to the recipient country of aid. We label this positive effect 
of aid as the ‘infrastructure effect’.
  On the other hand, Harms and Lutz (2006) also argue that foreign aid may en-
courage unproductive rent-seeking behaviours in the recipient country, leading to a drop 
in productivity. For example, when aid is provided, private firms might engage more in 
competition for rents from the aid and less in activities for improving their productivity 
such as training and R&D activities. Consequently, provision of foreign aid may reduce 
the marginal product of capital of the recipient and thus discourage FDI inflows to the 
recipient. We refer to this negative effect as the ‘rent-seeking effect’.8
  Several other possible effects of aid on FDI can be identified. For example, provi-
sion of aid, program aid in particular, improves the balance of payments, expanding the 
ability of the recipient country of aid to finance sustainable outflows of profit repatriation 
from FDI. Through this ‘financing effect’, aid may encourage FDI. Also, Arellano et 
al. (2009) point to a ‘Dutch disease’ effect of aid. Aid is likely to increase the supply of 
tradables and hence to lower their price relative to non-tradables. Since FDI in LDCs is 
mostly invested in tradable sectors, aid may discourage FDI through this channel which 
distorts the allocation of domestic resources.9 
  In addition to these effects suggested in existing studies, this paper proposes another 
effect of foreign aid on FDI, a positive effect through which foreign aid from a particular 
donor country promotes FDI from the same country but not from other countries. Since 
foreign aid acts as a ‘vanguard’ of FDI in this case, we refer to this effect as the ‘vanguard 
effect’ of aid. 
  We presume that this vanguard effect can be generated through the following three 
channels. First, Mody, Razin, and Sadka (2003) theoretically suggest and empirically find 
that information on the host economy should play a significant role in driving FDI flows, 
since FDI is risky to investors. However, information on the business environment of the 
host country, such as the skill level of local labour, conditions of infrastructure, the quality 
of bureaucrats, and explicit and implicit business rules and government regulations, is often 
inaccessible to foreign firms. Nevertheless, by engaging in activities funded by foreign aid, 
firms and government agencies of the donor country can obtain such information on the 
recipient country, and this information may spill over to other firms of the donor country. 
Second, the fact that the government provides foreign aid may reduce investment risks 
perceived subjectively by firms investing in the recipient country. Suppose, for example, a 
financial crisis like the Asian financial crisis of 1997 hits an LDC. Then, donor countries 6
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of aid to the country in trouble have larger incentives to bail out the recipient country 
than other countries without aid, since the provision of aid may reflect strong ties with the 
recipient country. Therefore, aid provides a quasi government guarantee to private firms 
and thus encourages FDI. Third, foreign aid from a donor country sometimes introduces 
to the recipient country business practices, rules, and systems of the donor country. If 
the donor's business systems become the de facto standard in the recipient country, the 
standard is likely to promote FDI from that donor country in particular. 
  It should be emphasised that through this vanguard effect, foreign aid from donor 
country i to recipient country j should promote FDI flows from country i to j, but not 
FDI from other countries to country j. In this regard, the vanguard effect is different 
from other effects, such as the infrastructure, rent-seeking, financing, and Dutch-disease 
effects, through which foreign aid by donor country i to recipient j should affect FDI 
from any country to j. 
  To estimate the effects of foreign aid that are not country-pair specific, such as the 
infrastructure and rent-seeking effects, we first employ the total amount of foreign aid 
from all member countries of OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), αi 
AIDij. However, we would expect that each of these effects of aid varies in size depend-
ing on the type of aid, particularly between aid for infrastructure and non-infrastructure. 
For example, the infrastructure effect works more in the case of infrastructure aid than 
in the case of non-infrastructure aid, while the financing effect works the opposite way. 
The rent-seeking effect may be associated with aid for both infrastructure and non-in-
frastructure. Distinguishing the effect of aid for infrastructure from the effect of aid for 
non-infrastructure is not easy in practice, since aid is fungible, that is aid for non-infra-
structure may lead to an increase in the recipient government's spending on infrastructure 
and vice versa. Despite this difficulty, we distinguish between aid for infrastructure (∑i 
AID_INFij) and for non-infrastructure (∑i AID_NonINFij) and estimate the impact of 
each type of aid on FDI to see any possible differences between the two types of aid. 
  To distinguish the country pair-specific vanguard effect from other effects, we next 
examine the effect of foreign aid from the home country of FDI, or country i, to the 
host country j, rather than the total foreign aid from all donor countries as used before. 
Under the vanguard hypothesis, infrastructure and non-infrastructure aid from country 
i to j, AID_INFij and AID_NonINFij, respectively, has a positive effect on FDI from i to 
j but no effect on FDI from other countries. The size of the effect of infrastructure and 
non-infrastructure aid may be different from each other, depending on how each type of 
aid promotes FDI through the three channels of the vanguard effect explained earlier. A 
priori, both types would raise the extent of the quasi government guarantee through aid, 
while information spillovers and transfer of country-specific business rules would work 7
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more in the case of infrastructure aid. 
(c) Estimation method
We employ two types of estimation method. We start with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation without fixed effects using robust standard errors adjusted for correlations 
within each country pair. The OLS estimators are consistent only when all regressors are 
orthogonal to the error term. However, there are two reasons why the orthogonality 
assumption may not hold in our FDI regression. First, as Egger (2005, 2002) argues, 
the error term may include unobserved country pair-specific effects that are correlated 
with regressors employed. Second, some of the regressors, such as foreign aid variables 
and GDP, are likely to be correlated with shocks that affect FDI. Many existing studies 
estimating income-growth regression on foreign aid argue possible simultaneity biases 
due to endogeneity of foreign aid variables and in fact find that OLS estimators are very 
different from estimators correcting for endogeneity Roodman (2007), Hansen and Tarp 
(2001), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Boone (1996). It is highly possible that foreign 
aid variables are also endogenous in FDI regression, since income growth and FDI flows 
are likely to be determined simultaneously. 
  Therefore, in order to correct for biases arising from country pair-specific fixed 
effects and endogeneity, we employ the system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimation developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). In the system GMM estimation, we 
apply GMM estimation to the system of equation (1) and its first-difference in which the 
country pair-specific fixed effects are eliminated, using the first-lagged and first-differenced 
regressors as instruments for equation (1) and the second lagged regressors as instruments 
for the first-differenced equation. The lagged regressors can be used as instruments, since 
they are predetermined and thus should not be correlated with the contemporaneous 
error term. The major advantage of the system GMM estimation, compared with its 
predecessor, the difference GMM developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), is that in 
the latter, instruments are weak if regressors have near unit root properties, whereas this 
problem can be alleviated in the former. We apply the two-step procedure to the system 
GMM estimation to obtain larger efficiency. In addition, we use Windmeijer's (2005) 
methodology to obtain robust standard errors. The estimator thus obtained is consistent 
even in the presence of heteroskedasticity and corrects for finite sample biases found in 
the two-step estimations. We test whether instruments are orthogonal to the error term 
using the Hansen j statistic and whether the error term is auto-correlated using the Arel-
lano-Bond statistic.108
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3. Data
Our sample consists of country pairs during the period 1990–2002, although data for 
the period 1985–1989 are used as instruments in the system GMM estimation. We limit 
source countries to the top five donor countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States)11, which contribute to around 70 per cent of the total 
aid from OECD countries, and recipient countries to low- or middle-income countries 
according to the World Bank's classifications in 1990. In addition, since we use first-dif-
ferenced FDI flows as a dependent variable and second-lagged FDI flows as an instrument 
in the system GMM estimation, we limit observations for which the first and second lags 
of FDI flows are available. Accordingly, our estimation is based on unbalanced panel of 
1,384 observations and 227 country pairs which include 98 recipient countries.12 The 
total amount of foreign aid in our sample consists of 42 per cent of the total amount of 
aid provided in the whole world during the same period. 
  Our dependent variable lnFDIijt is the natural logarithm of FDI flows from country 
i to LDC j.13 The amount of FDI flows for each home-host country pair is represented 
by gross FDI outflows from country i to j reported by country i, taken from OECD's 
International Direct Investment Statistics (available at http://miranda.sourceoecd.org/).14 
To construct real FDI, nominal FDI flows are divided by the GDP deflator of the host 
country, for which the base year is 2000, taken from World Bank's World Development 
Indicators 2006 (WDI). We add one before taking a log of real FDI flows.15
  Data on bilateral foreign aid are taken from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS) that provides detailed information on each activity funded by foreign aid.16 In 
particular, we aggregate the committed amount17 of bilateral foreign aid funded to each 
activity to construct the total inflows of foreign aid from donor country i to recipient 
country j in year t. We exclude from our foreign aid variables foreign aid activities coded 
as 900 in the CRS dataset. Aid of code 900 is excluded since this class of aid includes 
‘administrative costs of donors’ and ‘spending in the donor country for heightened aware-
ness/interest in development co-operation’ that are not spent in the recipient country. 
Using the data on foreign aid flows deflated by the GDP deflator of the recipient country, 
we construct real foreign aid from country i to country j in year t, AIDijt, and the total 
foreign aid from all donor countries to country j, αi AIDijt.18 
  In addition to the total amount of bilateral foreign aid, we distinguish between 
foreign aid for infrastructure and for non-infrastructure to highlight possible differences 
between the two types of aid. Since Harms and Lutz (2006) suggest that ‘infrastructure’ 
should be broadly defined and include economic and social infrastructure, we define for-
eign aid for infrastructure as the sum of foreign aid for ‘social infrastructure,’ ‘economic 
infrastructure,’ ‘production activities,’ and ‘multi-sector/cross-cutting’ classified in the 9
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CRS dataset. Aid for social infrastructure (coded as 100 in the CRS dataset) includes 
aid related to education and health, whereas aid for economic infrastructure (200) is for 
transport, energy, and financial services. Aid for production activities (300) is mostly for 
the agriculture, manufacturing, and mining industries, and multi-sector aid (400) is a 
mixture of those types of aid. 
  In contrast, foreign aid for non-infrastructure is defined as the sum of ‘commodity 
aid and general program assistance’ (500), ‘action relating to debt’ (600) and ‘humani-
tarian aid’ (700). The large part of the ‘commodity aid’ is food aid, whereas the ‘general 
program assistance’ corresponds to general budget support and does not include sector-
specific program assistance that is categorised as multi-sector aid. Aid for ‘action relating 
to debt’ is mostly spent on debt forgiveness. The ‘humanitarian aid’ is defined as assistance 
during and in the aftermath of emergencies. We take a log of these aid variables, after 
adding one,19 to create our key regressors related to foreign aid.
  Real GDP and real GDP per capita of the source and the recipient country of aid 
are taken from WDI. The measure of the relative skill level of the source country to the 
recipient is defined as the difference between the log of real GDP per capita of the two 
countries.20 Distance between two countries is defined as the distance between the capital 
cities of these countries and constructed from the longitude and latitude of the two cities 
taken from the NIJIX's web site (http://www.nijix.com). 
  In addition to the benchmark estimations, we also follow Harms and Lutz (2006) 
and Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005) and examine the relation between the level 
of governance and the size of the impact of aid. In these estimations, we use two govern-
ance indicators taken from Kaufmann and Kraay (2006). In particular, we use the index 
of the regulatory quality denoted as Kaufmann1, following Harms and Lutz (2006), 
or the sum of six indices for the level of voice and accountability, the political stability, 
the government effectiveness, the regulatory quality, the rule of law, and the control of 
corruption denoted as Kaufmann2, following Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005). 
Our governance indices are normalised so that the minimum is 0 with a higher score 
indicating a higher level of governance.21 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
used in the estimation. 10
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4. Estimation Results
(a) Results assuming no difference across donor countries
We start with the estimation of the impact of foreign aid on FDI, using the total aid from 
all donor countries to each recipient country, αi AIDij, as the key independent variable. 
The OLS and GMM results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, respectively. 
The p value of the Hansen J statistic and the Arellano-Bond statistic shown in the last 
two rows implies that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term and that the er-
ror term is not auto-correlated in the system GMM estimation. Since this is the case for 
all the system GMM estimations below, we will rely more on the GMM results than the 
OLS results. According to the GMM results in column 2 of Table 4, the effect of the 
total aid from all donor countries to country j on FDI from country i to j is positive but 
statistically insignificant. This evidence suggests that the total effect of foreign aid on 
FDI is not substantial. 
  Results on other control variables are mostly consistent with the theoretical predic-
tion. The source and the recipient country's GDP have a positive and significant effect 
on FDI, supporting the prediction of the KK model of multinationals. Geographic dis-
tance affects FDI negatively and significantly, supporting our gravity-type specification. 
The effect of the relative skill level of the home country to the host, SKDIF, is negative 
and significant, while the effect of its square is positive and significant.22 These results 
suggest that the effect of the relative skill level is U-shaped. In light of the KK model's 
prediction that a large difference in the skill level between the developed home country 
and the less developed host country facilitates vertical FDI, the results are consistent with 
this prediction for relatively poor LDCs. Our finding that the amount of FDI is large 
when the skill difference is very small may reflect another theoretical argument of the KK 
model that similarity in the skill level between the home and the host country promotes 
horizontal FDI when transportation costs are low. Since these results on other control 
variables will hold in most specifications below, we will henceforth focus on results on 
foreign aid variables. 
  Next, we follow Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005) 
and test whether the quality of governance of the recipient country affects the effect of 
foreign aid on FDI by including the interaction term between aid flows and an index of 
governance taken from Kaufmann and Kraay (2006). As the governance index, we use 
either the index for regulatory burden (Kaufman1), which is found to affect the size of 
the aid effect by Harms and Lutz (2006), or the sum of the six indices of governance 
(Kaufman2) used in Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005). The OLS and GMM results 11
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are reported in columns 3–6 of Table 2. Note that since the indices of governance are 
available from 1995, the sample size is smaller than in the estimation in columns 1 and 
2 of Table 2. In any specification, we find that the coefficient on aid and its interaction 
with the governance index is insignificant. The difference in estimation results between 
the existing studies and this paper probably comes from the difference in the data-sets 
used: the data-sets used in Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek 
(2005) are based on data for each recipient country, while our data-set is based on data 
for each source-recipient country pair. In any case, the two existing studies and this paper 
reached results contradicting one another, and thus whether the quality of governance 
affects the effect of foreign aid on FDI may be unclear. 
  Next, we distinguish between infrastructure and non-infrastructure aid and ex-
amine whether each type of aid promotes FDI. As we discussed earlier, there are several 
potential effects of aid on FDI, such as the infrastructure, rent-seeking, financing, and 
Dutch-disease effects, and each effect differs in that it works in the case of infrastructure 
or non-infrastructure aid or both. Therefore, the effect of each type of aid may differ. The 
OLS and GMM results from using both aid for infrastructure and non-infrastructure are 
reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, respectively. The OLS and GMM results show 
that the effect of both aid for infrastructure and for non-infrastructure is insignificant. 
We further test whether the difference in size between the effects of the two types of aid 
is zero by a Wald test. The p value of the Wald test is 0.83 in the OLS estimation and 
0.31 in the GMM, suggesting no difference.23 
  Since the two types of aid stock are correlated,24 standard errors in models 1 and 
2 of Table 3 may be overestimated due to multi-collinearity. We thus estimate the effect 
of each of the two types of aid separately, but our OLS and GMM estimation again leads 
to insignificant effect of aid for infrastructure and non-infrastructure (columns 3–6 of 
Table 3).
  Furthermore, in order to highlight the vanguard effect through which foreign aid 
from a donor country promotes FDI from the donor but not from other countries, we 
regress bilateral FDI flows on aid from the home country of FDI in particular, AIDij, 
rather than total aid from all donor countries, αi AIDij, as we used above. The GMM 
results reported in column 1 of Table 4 indicate that foreign aid has no significant effect 
on FDI from the donor country. This is the case even when we distinguish between aid 
for infrastructure and non-infrastructure (columns 2–4 of Table 4). This evidence rejects 
the presence of the vanguard effect of aid.
  In summary, our results suggest that foreign aid does not promote FDI.25 However, 
we have so far assumed that the effect of foreign aid on FDI does not vary in size across 
donor countries. This assumption may not hold in practice, since objectives, methods, and 12
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modality of foreign aid vary substantially across donors. Therefore, in the next subsection 
we will relax this assumption.
(b) Results assuming possible differences across donor countries
We now examine possible differences in the size of the aid effect across donor countries. 
First, we estimate the effect of foreign aid from each of the five donor countries on FDI to 
the recipient country of aid and show the GMM results in Table 5. In the table, subscripts 
FR, GM, JP, UK, and US denote France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, respectively. Thus, for example, lnAIDFR,j in the first row denotes the log 
of aid from France to country j. The dependent variable is still the log of FDI flows from 
country i to j, as before. Thus, the result in the row of lnAIDFR,j indicates the effect of 
aid from France on FDI from any country to the recipient country of the French aid. 
  Column 1 of Table 5 reports GMM results without distinguishing between aid 
for infrastructure and non-infrastructure. The GMM results indicate that aid from any 
particular donor country has no significant impact on FDI at the five-per cent level. In 
addition, we examine the effect of aid for infrastructure and non-infrastructure separately, 
employing both types together (column 2), only aid for infrastructure (column 3), or 
only aid for non-infrastructure (column 4), and we again find no effect of aid in most 
cases. Although the effect of aid for infrastructure from the United States is negative and 
significant at the 10-per cent level in column 2, it is insignificant in column 3. Similarly, 
although the effect of non-infrastructure aid from the United States is insignificant in 
column 2, it is negative and significant at the five-per cent level. Therefore, the negative 
effect of US aid found in some specifications is not robust, and it is not clear whether US 
aid has in fact a negative impact on FDI.
  It should be noted that the p value of the Hansen J statistic is very close to 1 in 
columns 1–3 of Table 5. According to Roodman (2007), a high p value is obtained when 
there are too many instruments, and in that case the Hansen J test is weak. However, 
since we have found in Table 3 that the lagged foreign aid variables are orthogonal to 
the error term, the lagged foreign aid variables for each donor country used in Table 5 
as instruments are also likely to be orthogonal to the error term. Therefore, we conclude 
that biases due to too many instruments may not be large in the GMM estimations in 
Table 5. 
  We further estimate the effect of foreign aid from each of the five donor countries 
on FDI from the donor country of aid and present the results in Table 6. This is differ-
ent from the estimation performed just above (Table 5) in that we are now testing the 
vanguard effect of aid from each donor. For this purpose, we use as regressors lnAIDFR,j 
× FRj and corresponding interaction terms for other donors, where FRj is a dummy vari-13
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able which is one if the home country of FDI, or country i, is France and zero otherwise. 
Since lnAIDFR,j × FRj is zero unless the source country of FDI is also France, this can 
test the vanguard effect of French aid. 
  The GMM results reported in column 1 of Table 6 indicate that aid from Japan 
has a positive and significant (at the five-per cent level) effect on FDI particularly from 
Japan, whereas aid from the United States has a negative effect. When we use aid for 
infrastructure and non-infrastructure separately as regressors (columns 2–4), we find a 
significant effect in the case of Japanese aid for infrastructure (columns 2 and 3) that is 
similar in size to the effect of Japanese aid of all types (column 1). In contrast, the effect 
of Japanese aid for non-infrastructure is insignificant in columns 2 and 4 at the five-per 
cent level. The negative effect of US aid becomes insignificant at the five-per-cent level 
when we distinguish between the two types of aid, suggesting that these results are not 
robust to alternative specifications.26 Therefore, only the positive effect of Japanese aid 
for infrastructure is robust and significant in our estimation. 
  Since the p value of Hansen J statistics in Table 6 is 1.000, or close to one as in 
Table 5, there may be a problem of too many instruments again. To avoid these possible 
biases, we drop the aid variables except for that of Japan to lower the number of regres-
sors and thus the number of instruments. Although we do not show the results from this 
modification for reasons of brevity, we find no substantial change in the effect of Japanese 
aid compared with the results in Table 6. The p value of the Hansen J statistic is about 
0.2, indicating that there are not too many instruments in those GMM estimations. 
  This evidence on Japanese aid, combined with the previous evidence found in Table 
5 that aid from Japan does not promote FDI in general, supports the vanguard hypothesis 
of foreign aid in the case of Japanese aid. In other words, while foreign aid has no effect 
on FDI in general, foreign aid from Japan in particular is likely to promote FDI from 
Japan. However, this positive effect of Japanese aid is limited to FDI from Japan: that is, 
Japanese aid has no effect on FDI from other countries. 
  The size of the vanguard effect of Japanese aid is quantitatively large. The average 
of the log of FDI flows from Japan to the six East Asian countries in our sample (China, 
the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) is 13.2, whereas 
the average of the log of foreign aid for infrastructure from Japan to these countries is 
12.7. Using the coefficient of the Japanese aid in column 3 of Table 6, 0.064, we conclude 
that six per cent (= 0.064 × 12.7/13.2) of Japanese FDI in East Asia is attributable to 
the presence of Japanese aid. 14
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(c) Robustness checks
In the previous section, we examined the relation between FDI flows and the previous 
year's foreign aid flows, using annual data. A shortcoming of this specification is that we 
ignore the impact of foreign aid provided more than two years before on current FDI 
flows. This shortcoming may be serious when we examine the infrastructure effect of 
aid, since infrastructure previously built using foreign aid would attract FDI in the long 
run. Another shortcoming is that the key variables in the gravity model, such as FDI 
and GDP, fluctuate annually to a large extent according to business cycles. Foreign aid is 
also found volatile (Bulir and Hamann 2008). Such fluctuations may lead to a bias in the 
estimation, although we alleviated the possible biases by incorporating year dummies and 
employing the system GMM procedure. In addition, annual data may be contaminated 
by time-series correlation in the dependent and independent variables. Although the use 
of the dynamic panel GMM estimation alleviates the problem of non-stationarity (Yao 
2006), the vanguard effect of Japanese aid found earlier may still have reflected a spurious 
relation between FDI and aid if the FDI and aid variables have unit-root properties. 
  To alleviate these potential problems, we re-estimate the aid-FDI nexus using 
data based on three-year averages. More specifically, we divide the 18-year period from 
1985 to 2002 to six three-year periods and average all the variables used in the previous 
estimations over the three years. Since we take first differences and use second lagged 
independent variables as instruments in the system GMM estimation, we have four periods 
for the estimation. By using the three-year averages, we can incorporate a longer-term 
effect and reduces effects of volatility. In addition, since the dynamic GMM can be applied 
when the number of time periods is small compared with the number of cross-section 
units (Bond 2002), the dynamic GMM estimation using the shorter panel based on the 
three-year averages performs better in order to alleviate biases due to non-stationarity. 
  Tables 7–8 show the results using the three-year averages. To save space, we only 
show several representative results corresponding to the benchmark results in Tables 
2–6. The results in Table 7 indicate that foreign aid has no significant effect on FDI in 
any specification when we assume that the aid effect does not vary in size among donor 
countries. In addition, column 3 of Table 8 indicates that aid for infrastructure from Japan 
and the United Kingdom has a positive and significant effect on FDI from the donor 
country, while the results on the donor country-specific effect of aid for other donors are 
not significant. 
  In addition, as another robustness check, we focus on poorer countries as recipient 
countries. Although our sample has so far included middle- and low-income countries, 
some of which are relatively advanced, we now use the sub-sample for countries that are 
defined as lower-middle or low income countries in 1990 by the World Development 15
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Indicators and repeat the same regressions as in Tables 2–6. Since the results are quali-
tatively the same as the benchmark results presented in Tables 2–6, Table 9 show only 
the results corresponding to those in column 1 of Tables 5 and 6. Column 2 of Table 
9 clearly indicates that Japanese aid has a positive vanguard effect, while aid from other 
countries has no vanguard effect. Since the coefficient on the Japanese aid is more than 
twice as large as that using the whole sample, we conclude that the vanguard effect of 
Japanese aid is even larger for poorer countries. 
  In summary, these results using three-year averages and using the LDC sample 
are mostly consistent with the benchmark results using annual data. In particular, results 
from all specifications indicate that Japanese aid for infrastructure has a positive and highly 
significant effect on FDI from Japan. By contrast, effects which are significant in some 
specifications, such as a negative effect of US aid (Table 6) and a positive vanguard effect 
of UK aid (Table 8), are not robust to alternative specifications, leading to a doubt about 
the presence of those effects. 
(d) Why is Japanese aid so unique?
According to the findings above, we conclude that foreign aid from any donor country 
has no infrastructure or rent-seeking effect on FDI. Aid from Japan has a vanguard effect, 
promoting FDI from Japan, while aid from other countries has no vanguard effect. This 
evidence emphasises a distinct feature of Japanese aid compared to aid from other coun-
tries. Now the remaining question is: why is Japanese aid so unique? In this subsection, 
we introduce some discussion about the characteristics of Japanese foreign aid. 
  One may hypothesise that the focus of Japanese aid on economic infrastructure 
may have induced its vanguard effect. In fact, Japan spent more than 50 per cent of its 
total aid on economic infrastructure in 2002, while other top donors spent less than 15 
per cent on that type of aid. Thus, the positive impact of Japanese aid on Japanese FDI 
we found may have picked up a positive effect of aid for economic infrastructure. To test 
this hypothesis, we regress FDI on aid for economic infrastructure from the home country 
of FDI and other benchmark regressors, but we do not find any significant effect of aid 
for economic infrastructure.27 
  Another possibility is related to the degree of ‘tied’ aid in which procurement of the 
goods and services involved is limited to the donor country. Some may argue that since 
Japanese aid is often tied, it is not surprising that Japanese aid promotes Japanese FDI. 
However, this is not the case for two reasons. First, while tied aid does promote purchases 
from the donor country, or exports from the donor, it does not necessarily promote FDI 
inflows from the donor, or investment in the recipient country for long-term purposes. 
Second and more importantly, the share of tied aid in total aid for Japan is in fact low: 16
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it was 15 per cent in 1990 and 9 per cent in 2002, lower than the average share for all 
DAC countries, 32 and 11 per cent, respectively DAC (2007). The low share of tied aid 
in the case of Japan comes mostly from the fact that a large proportion of Japanese aid is 
loans which cannot be tied aid by agreement among DAC countries. 
  Then, what are the characteristics of Japanese aid that promote Japanese FDI? Above 
all, we should note that the Japanese government has indeed intended to promote FDI 
from Japan through foreign aid, particularly in East and Southeast Asia where Japanese 
firms have developed production and trade networks. This intension of the Japanese 
government has been emphasised in a number of articles including Kawai and Takagi 
(2004), DAC (2003), and Arase (1994). 
  In practice, the Japanese government employs a number of measures to promote 
FDI through aid. Most notably, when Japanese aid is provided, there is close coordination 
between the public and private sectors through, for example, participation of representa-
tives of the private sector in government committees on foreign aid and exchange of 
personnel between aid agencies and private firms Arase (1994). 
  Such close inter-action between the public and private sectors should lead to sp-
illovers of information on the recipient country's business environment to private firms 
through foreign aid, encouraging FDI. In addition, private firms can easily propose aid 
projects that facilitate implementation of business standards, rules, and systems specific 
to Japanese firms, such as kaizen28. The Japanese government in fact provides technical 
assistance to teach such Japanese business systems and funds to transplant certification 
systems for management and engineering skills developed and used in Japan. Those types 
of aid are likely to promote Japanese FDI but not the FDI of other countries. Further-
more, due to the close interaction between public and private sectors in Japan, the fact 
that the Japanese government provides foreign aid to a particular country should reduce 
that recipient country's risks as perceived subjectively by Japanese firms.29 
  Through these channels, the vanguard effect of Japanese aid is likely to be purposely 
generated by the close interaction between public and private sectors.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates whether and how foreign aid facilitates FDI flows into LDCs, 
applying data for each source-recipient country pair to gravity equation-type estimation. 
Our empirical methodology enables us to distinguish between standard effects of aid, 
including the infrastructure, rent-seeking, financing, and Dutch-disease effects, and the 
vanguard effect through which aid from a donor country promotes FDI from the donor 
in particular. Possible reasons for the vanguard effect are that aid could transmit tacit 17
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information on the business environment of the recipient country, reduce country risk 
with the provision of a quasi government guarantee, and set donor country-specific busi-
ness standards in advance of private investment. Our results indicate that foreign aid in 
general does not necessarily have a significant effect. However, when we allow for differ-
ences in the size of aid effects across donors, we find robust evidence that infrastructure 
aid from Japan has a vanguard effect. In other words, Japanese aid promotes FDI from 
Japan, while having no impact on FDI from other countries. 
  Our results may lead to two opposing views toward Japanese aid. On the one hand, 
since existing studies found a possible link between FDI and income growth under cer-
tain conditions,30 our results imply that Japanese aid may have helped at least some of its 
recipient countries raise their income level indirectly by encouraging Japanese FDI to the 
recipients. This view is in fact supported by the Japanese government, which argues that 
provision of a ‘trinity,’ the combination of FDI, trade, and aid, is helpful in developing 
LDCs economies (Arase 1994) and hence that Japanese FDI promoted by aid is beneficial 
not only to Japanese firms but also to LDCs. Based on this argument, the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan advocates experiences of Japan's economic 
cooperation in East Asia as the successful ‘Japan's ODA (official development assistance) 
model’ (METI 2006). On the other hand, the same results can suggest that Japanese aid 
is aimed at provision of business opportunities to Japanese firms, rather than reduction 
of poverty in LDCs. So a possible policy implication from the empirical evidence is that 
the Japanese government should modify the focus of Japanese aid toward more direct 
channels of poverty alleviation.
  Unfortunately, however, the present paper cannot clearly indicate which view fits 
the actual role of Japanese aid in economic growth in LDCs, since our analysis is limited 
to the aid-FDI nexus and does not cover the aid-growth nexus through FDI. We expect 
that future studies can fill the missing link between the aid-FDI nexus and the FDI-growth 
nexus. 
  Finally, an important caveat of this study should be mentioned. In this study, we 
incorporated differences in aid effects between donors and between aid for infrastruc-
ture and non-infrastructure. However, aid effects may depend on other factors, such as 
economic and social conditions of the recipient country, and modality and volatility of 
aid. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper and should be examined in further 
studies. 18
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
	 Description	 Number	of	 Mean	 Standard	 Min.	 Max.	
	 	 observations	 	 deviation
lnFDIij	 Log	of	FDI	flows	from	 
	 country	i	to	j	 1384	 11.03	 2.16	 2.66	 16.40 
ln	∑i	AIDij	 Log	of	total	aid	from	all	 
	 countries	to	j	 1384	 11.80	 1.93	 5.74	 16.41 
ln	∑i	AID_INFij	 Log	of	total	aid	for	infrastructure	 
	 from	all	countries	to	j	 1384	 11.52	 2.04	 0.00	 15.19 
ln	∑i	AID_NonINFij	 Log	of	total	aid	for	non-	infras- 
	 tructure	from	all	countries	to	j	 1384	 8.02	 3.89	 0.00	 16.21 
lnAIDij	 Log	of	aid	from	country	i	to	j	 1384	 7.22	 4.52	 0.00	 15.85 
lnAID_INFij	 Log	of	aid	for	infrastructure	from	 
	 country	i	to	j	 1384	 6.76	 4.63	 0.00	 15.04 
lnAID_NonINFij	 Log	of	aid	for	non-	infrastructure	 
	 from	country	i	to	j	 1384	 2.43	 3.90	 0.00	 15.85 
lnGDPi	 Log	of	GDP	of	country	i	 1384	 21.46	 0.68	 20.77	 23.01 
lnGDPj	 Log	of	GDP	of	country	j	 1384	 17.87	 1.71	 10.67	 20.99 
lnDISTij	 Log	of	distance	between	i	and	j	 1384	 8.53	 0.90	 5.63	 9.82 
SKDIFij	 Difference	in	the	log	of	GDP	per	 
	 capita	between	i	and	j	 1384	 2.49	 0.95	 0.67	 5.94 
Kaufmann1j	 Index	of	the	regulatory	quality	 793	 4.21	 0.62	 1.29	 5.66 
Kaufmann2j	 Sum	of	6	indices	of	governance	 786	 16.80	 3.19	 7.83	 23.9421
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Table 2: Impact of Total Foreign Aid from All Donor Countries 
Dependent variable: log of the amount of FDI flows from country i to country j  	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	 OLS	 GMM	 OLS	 GMM	 OLS	 GMM
lnFDI	 0.684	 0.398	 0.634	 0.330	 0.630	 0.324 
	 (0.020)**	 (0.058)**	 (0.029)**	 (0.067)**	 (0.029)**	 (0.067)** 
ln	∑i	AIDij	 0.009	 0.004	 -0.159	 -0.125	 -0.197	 -0.079 
	 (0.025)	 (0.041)	 (0.148)	 (0.313)	 (0.178)	 (0.408) 
ln	∑i	AIDij	*	Kaufmann1j	 	 	 0.009	 0.011	 	  
	 	 	 (0.008)	 (0.018)	 	  
Kaufmann1j	 	 	 -0.067	 -0.078	 	  
	 	 	 (0.095)	 (0.194)	 	  
ln	∑i	AIDij	*	Kaufmann2j	 	 	 	 	 0.043	 0.029 
	 	 	 	 	 (0.041)	 (0.093) 
Kaufmann2j	 	 	 	 	 -0.282	 0.129 
	 	 	 	 	 (0.452)	 (1.155) 
lnGDPi	 0.960	 4.779	 1.330	 2.393	 1.390	 3.390 
	 (1.266)	 (1.898)*	 (2.158)	 (2.743)	 (2.150)	 (2.596) 
lnGDPj	 0.232	 0.473	 0.337	 0.610	 0.340	 0.546 
	 (0.028)**	 (0.104)**	 (0.047)**	 (0.135)**	 (0.045)**	 (0.111)** 
SKDIFij	 -0.167	 -1.095	 0.056	 -0.733	 -0.006	 -0.078 
	 (0.181)	 (0.499)*	 (0.307)	 (0.854)	 (0.286)	 (0.955) 
SKDIFj2	 0.021	 0.214	 -0.010	 0.137	 0.008	 0.027 
	 (0.030)	 (0.089)*	 (0.052)	 (0.162)	 (0.049)	 (0.174) 
lnDISTij	 -0.139	 -0.289	 -0.173	 -0.341	 -0.192	 -0.317 
	 (0.038)**	 (0.070)**	 (0.050)**	 (0.081)**	 (0.050)**	 (0.080)** 
No.	of	observations	 1384	 1384	 786	 786	 793	 793 
R-squared	 0.737	 	 0.721	 	 0.728	  
Hansen	J	statistic	 	 0.165	 	 0.573	 	 0.700 
Arellano-Bond	statistic	 	 0.114	 	 0.202	 	 0.213
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Year dummies and donor-country dummies are included in all specifications. GMM 
estimation is based on the system GMM estimation developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). P values are 
reported for the Hansen J and Arellano-Bond statistics. Description of regressors are as follows: AIDij = 
foreign aid from country i to country j; Kaufmann1j = index of regulatory quality of country j taken from 
Kaufmann et al. (2006); Kaufmann2ij = sum of 6 indices of governance of country j taken from Kaufmann 
et al. (2006); GDPi(j) = GDP of country i (j); SKDIFij = measure of skill differences; DISTij = distance 
between country i and j. All regressors are first lagged. 22
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Table 3: Differences between Aid for Infrastructure and Non-Infrastructure
Dependent variable: log of the amount of FDI flows from country i to country j  	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	 OLS	 GMM	 OLS	 GMM	 OLS	 GMM
Lagged	lnFDI	 0.685	 0.393	 0.685	 0.387	 0.685	 0.386 
	 (0.020)**	 (0.053)**	 (0.020)**	 (0.058)**	 (0.020)**	 (0.059)** 
ln	∑i	AID_INFij	 -0.008	 -0.013	 -0.009	 -0.002	 	  
	 (0.024)	 (0.032)	 (0.023)	 (0.034)	 	  
ln	∑i	AID_NonINFij	 -0.001	 0.025	 	 	 -0.002	 0.026 
	 (0.010)	 (0.017)	 	 	 (0.009)	 (0.016) 
lnGDPi	 0.920	 5.985	 0.917	 5.328	 0.942	 5.348 
	 (1.268)	 (2.118)**	 (1.267)	 (2.067)**	 (1.265)	 (1.962)** 
lnGDPj	 0.242	 0.421	 0.242	 0.448	 0.238	 0.441 
	 (0.029)**	 (0.080)**	 (0.029)**	 (0.095)**	 (0.026)**	 (0.086)** 
SKDIFij	 -0.097	 -0.755	 -0.098	 -0.895	 -0.126	 -0.910 
	 (0.185)	 (0.393)	 (0.185)	 (0.512)	 (0.161)	 (0.421)* 
SKDIFj2	 0.013	 0.143	 0.013	 0.177	 0.017	 0.179 
	 (0.031)	 (0.073)	 (0.031)	 (0.091)	 (0.028)	 (0.078)* 
lnDISTij	 -0.134	 -0.241	 -0.134	 -0.278	 -0.136	 -0.281 
	 (0.038)**	 (0.067)**	 (0.038)**	 (0.073)**	 (0.037)**	 (0.066)** 
No.	of	observations	 1384	 1384	 1384	 1384	 1384	 1384 
R-squared	 0.737	 	 0.737	 	 0.737	  
Hansen	J	statistic	 	 0.291	 	 0.164	 	 0.254 
Arellano-Bond	statistic	 	 0.126	 	 0.125	 	 0.132
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Year dummies and donor-country dummies are included in all specifications. GMM 
estimation is based on the system GMM estimation developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). P values are 
reported for the Hansen J and Arellano-Bond statistics. Description of regressors are as follows: AID_INFij 
= aid for infrastructure from country i to j; AID_NonINFij = aid for non-infrastructure from country i to j; 
GDPi(j) = GDP of country i (j); SKDIFij = measure of skill differences; DISTij = distance between country i 
and j. All regressors are first lagged. 23
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Table 4: Impact of Foreign Aid on FDI from the Donor
Dependent variable: log of the amount of FDI flows from country i to country j	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 GMM	 GMM	 GMM	 GMM
 
Lagged	lnFDI	 0.387	 0.403	 0.381	 0.406 
	 (0.062)**	 (0.055)**	 (0.064)**	 (0.058)** 
lnAIDij	 0.013	 	 	  
	 (0.015)	 	 	  
lnAID_INFij	 	 0.010	 0.014	  
	 	 (0.014)	 (0.015)	  
lnAID_NonINFij	 	 0.015	 	 0.010 
	 	 (0.013)	 	 (0.013) 
lnGDPi	 5.011	 6.189	 5.387	 5.111 
	 (2.114)*	 (2.110)**	 (2.174)*	 (1.990)* 
lnGDPj	 0.454	 0.428	 0.444	 0.463 
	 (0.088)**	 (0.086)**	 (0.094)**	 (0.089)** 
SKDIFij	 -1.286	 -1.215	 -1.254	 -1.178 
	 (0.464)**	 (0.437)**	 (0.500)*	 (0.481)* 
SKDIFj2	 0.250	 0.234	 0.243	 0.229 
	 (0.086)**	 (0.082)**	 (0.092)**	 (0.086)** 
lnDISTij	 -0.292	 -0.291	 -0.313	 -0.293 
	 (0.077)**	 (0.073)**	 (0.080)**	 (0.075)** 
No.	of	observations	 1384	 1384	 1384	 1384 
Hansen	J	statistic	 0.216	 0.218	 0.138	 0.293 
Arellano-Bond	statistic	 0.116	 0.114	 0.126	 0.106
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Year dummies and donor-country dummies are included in all specifications. 
GMM estimation is based on the system GMM estimation developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). P 
values are reported for the Hansen J and Arellano-Bond statistics. Description of regressors are as follows: 
AIDij = foreign aid from country i to country j; AID_INFij = aid for infrastructure from country i to j; 
AID_NonINFij = aid for non-infrastructure from country i to j; GDPi(j) = GDP of country i (j); SKDIFij = 
measure of skill differences; DISTij = distance between country i and j. All regressors are first lagged. 24
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Table 5: Difference in Impacts of Aid across Donor Countries
Dependent variable: log of the amount of FDI flows from country i to country j	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 GMM	 GMM	 GMM	 GMM
lnAIDFR,	j		 -0.017	 	 	  
	 (0.016)	 	 	  
lnAIDGM,	j		 0.015	 	 	  
	 (0.011)	 	 	  
lnAIDJP,	j		 0.012	 	 	  
	 (0.013)	 	 	  
lnAIDUK,	j	 0.009	 	 	  
	 (0.016)	 	 	  
lnAIDUS,	j		 -0.011	 	 	  
	 (0.012)	 	 	  
lnAID_INFFR,	j		 	 -0.019	 -0.015	  
	 	 (0.019)	 (0.017)	  
lnAID_INFGM,	j		 	 0.012	 0.009	  
	 	 (0.011)	 (0.012)	  
lnAID_INFJP,	j		 	 0.011	 0.007	  
	 	 (0.012)	 (0.013)	  
lnAID_INFUK,	j	 	 -0.002	 0.002	  
	 	 (0.015)	 (0.016)	  
lnAID_INFUS,	j		 	 -0.024	 -0.017	  
	 	 (0.012)	 (0.014)	  
lnAID_NonINFFR,	j		 	 -0.005	 	 -0.008 
	 	 (0.014)	 	 (0.014) 
lnAID_NonINFGM,	j		 	 -0.008	 	 -0.004 
	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012) 
lnAID_NonINFJP,	j		 	 0.009	 	 0.005 
	 	 (0.013)	 	 (0.012) 
lnAID_NonINFUK,	j	 	 -0.009	 	 -0.008 
	 	 (0.016)	 	 (0.018) 
lnAID_NonINFUS,	j		 	 -0.011	 	 -0.029 
	 	 (0.012)	 	 (0.012)* 
No.	of	observations	 1384	 1384	 1384	 1384 
Hansen	J	statistic	 0.979	 1.000	 0.978	 0.462 
Arellano-Bond	statistic	 0.117	 0.056	 0.119	 0.037
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All control variables used in the benchmark estimation, year dummies, and donor-country 
dummies are included in all specifications. GMM estimation is based on the system GMM estimation 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). P values are reported for the Hansen J and Arellano-Bond 
statistics. Description of regressors are as follows: AIDij = foreign aid from country i to country j; AID_INFij 
= aid for infrastructure from country i to j; AID_NonINFij = aid for non-infrastructure from country i to 
j; FR, GM JP, UK, and US, denote France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
respectively. All regressors are first lagged. 25
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Table 6: Difference in Vanguard Effects of Aid between Donor Countries
Dependent variable: log of the amount of FDI flows from country i to country j	
	 (1)	 	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 GMM	 	 GMM	 GMM	 GMM
lnAIDFR,	j	•	FRi	 -0.064	 lnAID_INFFR,	j	•	FRi	 -0.031	 -0.030	  
	 (0.059)	 	 (0.038)	 (0.043)	  
lnAIDGM,	j	•	GMi	 0.010	 lnAID_INFGM,	j	•	GMi	 -0.001	 -0.004	  
	 (0.027)	 	 (0.019)	 (0.021)	  
lnAIDJP,	j	•	JPi	 0.082	 lnAID_INFJP,	j	•	JPi	 0.074	 0.064	  
	 (0.032)*	 	 (0.028)**	 (0.025)*	  
lnAIDUK,	j	•	UKi	 -0.006	 lnAID_INFUK,	j	•	UKi	 -0.015	 0.007	  
	 (0.044)	 	 (0.050)	 (0.045)	  
lnAIDUS,	j	•	USi	 -0.157	 lnAID_INFUS,	j	•	USi	 -0.011	 -0.051	  
	 (0.071)*	 	 (0.056)	 (0.043)	  
	 	 lnAID_NonINFFR,	j	•	FRi	 0.033	 	 0.030 
	 	 	 (0.025)	 	 (0.025) 
	 	 lnAID_NonINFGM,	j	•	GMi	 0.015	 	 0.026 
	 	 	 (0.013)	 	 (0.014) 
	 	 lnAID_NonINFJP,	j	•	JPi	 0.038	 	 0.055 
	 	 	 (0.038)	 	 (0.029) 
	 	 lnAID_NonINFUK,	j	•	UKi	 -0.005	 	 -0.001 
	 	 	 (0.058)	 	 (0.049) 
	 	 lnAID_NonINFUS,	j	•	USi	 -0.044	 	 -0.050 
	 	 	 (0.024)	 	 (0.028) 
No.	of	observations	 1384	 	 1384	 1384	 1384 
Hansen	J	statistic	 1.000	 	 1.000	 0.985	 0.969 
Arellano-Bond	statistic	 0.161	 	 0.124	 0.152	 0.089
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All control variables used in the benchmark estimation, year dummies, and donor-country 
dummies are included in all specifications. GMM estimation is based on the system GMM estimation 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). P values are reported for the Hansen J and Arellano-Bond 
statistics. Description of regressors are as follows: AIDij = foreign aid from country i to country j; AID_INFij 
= aid for infrastructure from country i to j; AID_NonINFij = aid for non-infrastructure from country i 
to j; FR, GM JP, UK, and US, denote France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, respectively; CTYi = a dummy variable that is one if source country i is CTY. Thus, for example, 
lnAIDFR,j•FRj can be non-zero only when the home country of FDI in the left-hand side is France. All 
regressors are first lagged. 26
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Table 7: Results Using 3-Year Averages (1)
Dependent variable: log of the amount of FDI stock from country i to country j	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 GMM	 GMM	 GMM	 GMM
Comparable	 
benchmark	model	 Table	2	(2)	 Table	3	(2)	 Table	4	(1)	 Table	4	(2) 
Lagged	lnFDI	 0.403	 0.414	 0.406	 0.376 
	 (5.27)**	 (5.82)**	 (5.54)**	 (5.05)** 
ln	∑i	AIDij	 0.084	 	 	  
	 (0.69)	 	 	  
ln	∑i	AID_INFij	 	 0.026	 	  
	 	 (0.23)	 	  
ln	∑i	AID_NonINFij	 	 0.004	 	  
	 	 (0.09)	 	  
lnAIDij	 	 	 0.004	  
	 	 	 (0.09)	  
ln	AID_INFij	 	 	 	 0.047 
	 	 	 	 (1.35) 
ln	AID_NonINFij	 	 	 	 -0.046 
	 	 	 	 (1.52) 
lnGDPi	 4.898	 5.296	 4.348	 5.106 
	 (1.64)	 (1.87)	 (1.45)	 (2.00)* 
lnGDPj	 0.408	 0.444	 0.518	 0.503 
	 (2.95)**	 (3.56)**	 (3.81)**	 (3.59)** 
SKDIFij	 -0.970	 -0.977	 -1.580	 -1.451 
	 (1.06)	 (1.08)	 (1.74)	 (1.66) 
SKDIFj2	 0.186	 0.197	 0.296	 0.277 
	 (1.08)	 (1.13)	 (1.61)	 (1.51) 
lnDISTij	 -0.321	 -0.295	 -0.322	 -0.364 
	 (3.87)**	 (3.50)**	 (3.64)**	 (4.42)** 
No.	of	observations	 458	 458	 458	 458 
Hansen	J	statistic	 0.495	 0.571	 0.590	 0.593 
Arellano-Bond	statistic	 0.779	 0.822	 0.815	 0.742
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All control variables used in the benchmark estimation, year dummies, and donor-country 
dummies are included in all specifications. GMM estimation is based on the system GMM estimation 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). P values are reported for the Hansen J and Arellano-Bond 
statistics. Description of regressors are as follows: AIDij = stock of aid from country i to j. 27
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Table 8: Results Using 3-Year Averages (2)
Dependent variable: log of the amount of FDI stock from country i to country 	
	 (1)	 (2)	 	 (3)	 (4)	
	 GMM	 GMM	 	 GMM	 GMM
Comparable	 
benchmark	model	 Table	5	(1)	 Table	5	(3)	 Comparable	 
benchmark	model	 Table	6	(3)	 Table	6	(4) 
Lagged	lnFDI	 0.395	 0.457	 Lagged	lnFDI	 0.361	 0.372 
	 (5.09)**	 (6.96)**	 	 (5.08)**	 (4.51)** 
lnAIDFR,	j		 -0.035	 	 lnAID_INFFR,j	•	FRj	 0.038	  
	 (1.17)	 	 	 (0.33)	  
lnAIDGM,	j		 0.017	 	 lnAID_INFGM,j	•	GMj	 -0.023	  
	 (0.73)	 	 	 (0.55)	  
lnAIDJP,	j		 0.032	 	 lnAID_INFJP,j	•	JPj	 0.117	  
	 (1.23)	 	 	 (2.50)*	  
lnAIDUK,	j	 0.041	 	 lnAID_INFUK,j	•	UKj	 0.179	  
	 (1.17)	 	 	 (2.44)*	  
lnAIDUS,	j		 -0.012	 	 lnAID_INFUS,j	•	USj	 -0.087	  
	 (0.39)	 	 	 (0.88)	  
lnAID_INFFR,	j		 	 -0.020	 lnAID_NonINFFR,	j	•	FRi	 	 -0.044 
	 	 (0.95)	 	 	 (0.92) 
lnAID_INFGM,	j		 	 -0.026	 lnAID_NonINFGM,	j	•	GMi	 	 -0.005 
	 	 (1.11)	 	 	 (0.08) 
lnAID_INFJP,	j		 	 0.020	 lnAID_NonINFJP,	j	•	JPi	 	 -0.044 
	 	 (0.94)	 	 	 (1.07) 
lnAID_INFUK,	j	 	 -0.004	 lnAID_NonINFUK,	j	•	UKi	 	 0.016 
	 	 (0.13)	 	 	 (0.19) 
lnAID_INFUS,	j		 	 -0.024	 lnAID_NonINFUS,	j	•	USi	 	 -0.076 
	 	 (1.17)	 	 	 (1.02) 
lnGDPi	 5.807	 5.409	 lnGDPi	 4.394	 5.547 
	 (2.08)*	 (2.11)*	 	 (1.79)	 (2.46)* 
lnGDPj	 0.311	 0.385	 lnGDPj	 0.452	 0.411 
	 (2.61)**	 (3.85)**	 	 (3.83)**	 (2.89)** 
SKDIFij	 -1.564	 -0.483	 SKDIFij	 -1.640	 -0.861 
	 (1.67)	 (0.74)	 	 (2.33)*	 (1.24) 
SKDIFj2	 0.273	 0.103	 SKDIFj2	 0.313	 0.169 
	 (1.65)	 (0.85)	 	 (2.26)*	 (1.27) 
lnDISTij	 -0.348	 -0.293	 lnDISTij	 -0.368	 -0.337 
	 (3.93)**	 (4.32)**	 	 (4.71)**	 (4.09)** 
No.	of	observations	 458	 458	 No.	of	observations	 458	 458 
Hansen	J	statistic	 0.199	 0.423	 Hansen	J	statistic	 0.780	 0.475 
Arellano-Bond	statistic	 0.847	 0.703	 Arellano-Bond	statistic	 0.805	 0.932
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All control variables used in the benchmark estimation, year dummies, and donor-country 
dummies are included in all specifications. GMM estimation is based on the system GMM estimation 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). P values are reported for the Hansen J and Arellano-Bond 
statistics. Description of regressors are as follows: AIDij = stock of aid from country i to j; FR, GM JP, UK, 
and US, denote France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, respectively; CTYi = a 
dummy variable that is one if source country i is CTY. 28
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Table 9: Results Using the LDC Sample
Dependent variable: log of the amount of FDI stock from country i to country j	
	 (1)	 	 (2)	
	 GMM	 	 GMM
Comparable	 
benchmark	model	 Table	5	(1)	 	 Table	6	(1) 
lnAIDFR,	j		 -0.036	 lnAIDFR,j	•	FRj	 -0.043 
	 (0.023)	 	 (0.058) 
lnAIDGM,	j		 0.004	 lnAIDGM,j	•	GMj	 0.014 
	 (0.013)	 	 (0.018) 
lnAIDJP,	j		 0.031	 lnAIDJP,j	•	JPj	 0.157 
	 (0.020)	 	 (0.066)* 
lnAIDUK,	j	 0.004	 lnAIDUK,j	•	UKj	 0.027 
	 (0.019)	 	 (0.050) 
lnAIDUS,	j		 -0.029	 lnAIDUS,j	•	USj	 -0.131 
	 (0.018)	 	 (0.088)
No.	of	observations	 924	 No.	of	observations	 924 
Hansen	J	statistic	 1.000	 Hansen	J	statistic	 1.000 
Arellano-Bond	statistic	 0.327	 Arellano-Bond	statistic	 0.413
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and + signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All control variables used in the benchmark estimation, year dummies, and donor-country 
dummies are included in all specifications. GMM estimation is based on the system GMM estimation 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). P values are reported for the Hansen J and Arellano-Bond 
statistics. Description of regressors are as follows: AIDij = stock of aid from country i to j; FR, GM JP, UK, 
and US, denote France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, respectively; CTYi = a 
dummy variable that is one if source country i is CTY. 29
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Appendix Table: List of Country-Pairs
  France  Germany  Japan  United  United  Total	
	 	 	 	 Kingdom	 States
Albania	 6	 5	 0	 0	 0	 11 
Algeria	 6	 1	 0	 0	 0	 7 
Angola	 1	 2	 0	 0	 0	 3 
Antigua	and	Barbuda	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1 
Argentina	 12	 6	 13	 13	 11	 55 
Azerbaijan	 0	 5	 0	 0	 0	 5 
Bahrain	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Belarus	 0	 8	 0	 0	 0	 8 
Benin	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Bolivia	 5	 4	 0	 0	 0	 9 
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	 0	 2	 0	 0	 0	 2 
Botswana	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Brazil	 6	 8	 13	 13	 12	 52 
Bulgaria	 10	 10	 0	 3	 0	 23 
Burkina	Faso	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Cambodia	 3	 0	 0	 0	 0	 3 
Cameroon	 2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2 
Chad	 4	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4 
Chile	 4	 6	 13	 6	 12	 41 
China	 10	 13	 13	 9	 13	 58 
Colombia	 3	 6	 1	 6	 5	 21 
Comoros	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Congo	 2	 5	 0	 0	 0	 7 
Congo,	Dem.	Rep.	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Costa	Rica	 1	 6	 0	 0	 0	 7 
Cote	d'Ivoire	 4	 1	 0	 0	 0	 5 
Croatia	 6	 9	 0	 0	 0	 15 
Czech	Republic	 9	 8	 9	 5	 2	 33 
Dominica	 0	 7	 0	 0	 1	 8 
Ecuador	 7	 13	 0	 0	 1	 21 
Egypt	 13	 4	 1	 5	 1	 24 
El	Salvador	 0	 6	 0	 0	 0	 6 
Estonia	 2	 6	 0	 0	 0	 8 
Ethiopia	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1 
Gabon	 7	 0	 0	 0	 0	 7 
Ghana	 0	 3	 0	 0	 0	 3 
Grenada	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Guatemala	 0	 8	 0	 0	 0	 8 
Guinea	 5	 0	 0	 0	 0	 5 
Guinea-Bissau	 2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2 
Guyana	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Haiti	 2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2 
Hungary	 7	 9	 10	 6	 1	 33 
Indonesia	 10	 7	 13	 1	 10	 41 
India	 13	 10	 13	 10	 10	 56 
Iran	 3	 0	 0	 0	 1	 4 
Jamaica	 0	 6	 0	 0	 1	 7 
Jordan	 0	 5	 0	 0	 0	 5 
Kazakhstan	 1	 6	 0	 0	 0	 7 
Latvia	 2	 6	 0	 0	 0	 8 
Lebanon	 7	 7	 0	 0	 0	 14 
Liberia	 3	 4	 3	 0	 0	 10 
Lithuania	 6	 8	 0	 0	 0	 14 
Macedonia	 0	 6	 0	 0	 0	 6 
Madagascar	 2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 230
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Appendix Table: List of Country-Pairs (continued)
  France  Germany  Japan  United  United  Total	
	 	 	 	 Kingdom	 States
Malawi	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Malaysia	 7	 9	 13	 8	 5	 42 
Mali	 2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2 
Mauritius	 8	 3	 0	 0	 0	 11 
Mexico	 13	 7	 13	 9	 13	 55 
Moldova	 0	 5	 0	 0	 0	 5 
Morocco	 6	 8	 0	 1	 2	 17 
Namibia	 0	 11	 0	 0	 0	 11 
Nicaragua	 0	 3	 0	 0	 0	 3 
Nigeria	 0	 4	 0	 0	 0	 4 
Oman	 3	 3	 0	 0	 0	 6 
Pakistan	 8	 8	 0	 0	 0	 16 
Panama	 2	 5	 0	 0	 1	 8 
Paraguay	 4	 10	 0	 0	 1	 15 
Peru	 3	 3	 0	 0	 0	 6 
Philippines	 7	 10	 13	 10	 9	 49 
Poland	 7	 11	 11	 9	 4	 42 
Romania	 9	 7	 3	 0	 1	 20 
Russia	 9	 9	 9	 5	 0	 32 
Sao	Tome	and	Principe	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Senegal	 4	 3	 0	 0	 0	 7 
Serbia	and	Montenegro	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Seychelles	 0	 3	 0	 0	 0	 3 
Slovak	Republic	 5	 8	 0	 3	 0	 16 
Slovenia	 7	 7	 0	 2	 1	 17 
South	Africa	 8	 5	 5	 4	 5	 27 
South	Korea	 12	 10	 13	 7	 10	 52 
Sri	Lanka	 0	 3	 0	 0	 0	 3 
Suriname	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1 
Syria	 4	 4	 0	 0	 0	 8 
Thailand	 10	 12	 13	 12	 10	 57 
Trinidad	and	Tobago	 1	 6	 0	 0	 0	 7 
Tunisia	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Turkey	 13	 12	 13	 12	 13	 63 
Ukraine	 5	 6	 0	 3	 0	 14 
Uruguay	 8	 8	 0	 0	 1	 17 
Uzbekistan	 0	 4	 0	 0	 0	 4 
Vanuatu	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Venezuela	 6	 10	 6	 4	 10	 36 
Vietnam	 4	 4	 0	 0	 0	 8 
Yemen	 6	 3	 0	 0	 0	 9 
Zambia	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1 
Zimbabwe	 0	 3	 0	 0	 0	 3 
Total	 374	 460	 214	 166	 170	 1,384
Note: The number for each country pair represents the number of observations for the country pair during 
the 13-year period from 1990 to 2002. 31
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1   These two examples are cited in Harms and Lutz (2006).
2   Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005) both use governance 
indices constructed by an earlier version of Kaufmann et al. (2006). A notable difference 
between these two studies is the time period covered: 1988–1999 in Harms and Lutz (2006) 
and 1960–2004 in Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005).
3   Our finding is consistent with Blaise (2005) who finds that Japanese aid in China has a 
positive and significant impact on the locational choice of Japanese private investors in 
China, using province-level data for China. However, since Blaise (2005) does not examine 
the impact of Japanese aid on FDI from other countries, it is not clear from Blaise (2005) 
whether Japanese aid has a vanguard effect or other effects. 
4   The horizontal model of multinational enterprises typically explains FDI between similarly 
endowed countries (that is, between developed countries), but it can be applied to FDI from 
a developed country to a less developed country when the less developed country imposes 
trade restrictions so that export from the developed country to the less developed country 
may not be possible.
5   Most studies in the literature, such as Bergstrand and Egger (2007), Harms and Lutz 
(2006), Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005), and Wei (2000), use FDI inflows in gravity 
models of FDI, while some, such as Egger and Winner (2006), use FDI stocks. We follow 
the former specification, but in a robustness check not shown in this paper, we also regress 
FDI stocks on stocks of foreign aid and obtain similar results. 
6   As we will explain later, we employ the system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimation developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Since we estimate the equation without 
fixed effects in addition to the first-differenced equation in the system GMM estimation, 
we can estimate the effect of distance, even after controlling for fixed effects. 
7   Other possible control variables include a measure of country j's quality of governance that 
relates to FDI inflows employed in Egger and Winner (2006), a measure of openness of 
country j employed in Mody, Razin, and Sadka (2003), and a dummy variable for sharing 
a common official language employed in Bergstrand and Egger (2007). However, since we 
find that the effects of these variables are not statistically significant in most specifications, 
we do not use them for estimation.
8   Svensson (2000) argues that foreign aid and windfalls are on average associated with higher 
corruption in countries which suffer from powerful competing social groups.
9   The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the financing effect 
and the Dutch-disease effect. 
10   System GMM is estimated by using a Stata command of xtabond2 developed by David 
Roodman.
11   When we will later examine the effect of aid from each donor country, we will use aid from 
each donor as a separate regressor. Therefore, if we have many donors in our sample, we 
will have many regressors and thus many instruments in our system GMM estimation. As 
Roodman (2007) argues and Section 4.2 briefly explains, many instruments in the system 
GMM estimation lead to a weak test for over-identification. Therefore, we limit source 
countries to five.
12   The complete list of the country pairs used in this paper is shown in Appendix Table.32
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13   The use of logs implies that we drop observations when FDI inflows are negative due to 
sales of existing MNEs. As a robustness check, we used FDI inflows without taking a log 
as the dependent variable and obtained results similar to those using logs. 
14   In the data-set, OECD defines direct investment as the sum of new capital outflows and 
reinvested earnings. Direct investment comprises financing by an entity resident in a report-
ing country which has the objective of obtaining or retaining a lasting interest in an entity 
resident in an aid recipient country. ‘Lasting interest’ implies a long-term relationship where 
the direct investor has a significant influence on the management of the enterprise, reflected 
by ownership of at least 10 per cent of the shares of the enterprise, or the equivalent in 
voting power or other means of control.
15   The unit of FDI variables is 1,000 U.S. dollars.
16    CRS  contains  detailed  information  on  individual  aid  activities  of  most  of  the  23 
members  of  the  OECD's  DAC  as  well  as  those  of  multilateral  development  banks 
and  United  Nations  agencies.  The  whole  data-set  is  available  at:  http://www.
oecd.org/document/0/0,2340,en_2649_34447_37679488_1_1_1_1,00.html   
(last accessed on December 12, 2008). 
17   Using the disbursed amount of aid would be more appropriate than using its committed 
amount. However, according to CRS User's Guide available on the web site of the CRS (see 
the previous footnote), ‘Data on the amounts disbursed each year are available at the activity 
level for some, but not all, donors. Consequently, most analyses have to be undertaken on 
a commitment basis.’ Due to this data limitation, we use the committed amount of aid. 
18   Note that although donor countries other than the top five donors are excluded from the 
sample, aid from all donor countries, rather than aid from the top five donors, is aggregated 
to construct ∑i AIDijt.
19   The unit of aid variables is 1,000 U.S. dollars.
20   Instead of GDP per capita, we could use the level of education measured, for example, by 
the secondary enrolment ratio. However, we do not employ this due to the data limita-
tions.
21   Since the governance indicators of Kaufmann and Kraay (2006) are available only for 1996, 
1998, 2000, and 2002, we manipulate data for 1997, 1999, and 2001 from the average of 
the nearest two years and data for 1995 from the trend during the period 1996–1998.
22   We include the square term, since SKDIF does not have any significant effect when included 
alone in estimation while both SKDIF and its square have a highly significant effect when 
included together.
23   We also break down ‘infrastructure’ into social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, 
production, and multi-sector. However, we find no significant effect of either sub-category 
of aid for infrastructure.
24   The correlation coefficient of the two is 0.56.
25   Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek (2005) also find no significant 
effect of aid on FDI in most specifications in which the interaction term between aid and 
governance is not included.
26   Since the effect of US non-infrastructure aid is negative and significant at the 10-per cent 
level in columns 2 and 4 of Table 6, one may conclude that non-infrastructure aid of the 
United States discourages aid. A possible reason for the weak evidence of a negative effect 
of US non-infrastructure aid is that non-infrastructure aid from the United States, mostly 
aid for debt relief, may be regarded as a bad signal by foreign investors. 
27   We do not present the results for the sake of brevity.33
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